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In this Article I want to discuss some of the familiar ways in which
legal scholarship deals with the fact that law exists in and must to some
extent always be understood by reference to particular contexts of
space and time. I shall be making and trying to support an argument
that historicism,' the recognition of the historical and cultural con-
tingency of law, is a perpetual threat to the aims of our legal scholar-
ship as conventionally practiced; that to defend against the threat (or
to protect themselves from becoming aware of it) legal scholars have
regularly and recurrently resorted to certain strategies of response and
evasion; and finally, that these strategies have so influenced the prac-
tice of legal scholarship as severely to limit its intellectual options and
imaginative range. In concluding, I will attempt to suggest some ways
in which legal scholarship might break free of these limiting modes
of response.
Some cautions and disclaimers before going on. In order to discuss
within limited space how our legal scholars have dealt with the prob-
lem of historicism, and to cover a time period that is long enough to
justify the claim that certain strategies regularly recur, I will have to
summarize large bodies of thought rather rapidly and breathlessly,
doubtless shearing them in the process of many of their strengths and
subtleties. Moreover, as I hope will become clear, to say that work
is vulnerable to criticism from the perspective of historicism is not at
all to say that it is bad work. Even work whose every specific con-
clusion has been discredited can stand as a valuable contribution to
the conversation of mankind. My project is not to criticize specific
t Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin. My thanks to David Hollinger for his
comments on an early draft of this paper;, to Barbara Black and Morton Horwitz for
their comments at the symposium; to J.G.A. Pocock (whom I have never met), Charles
Gray, and Elizabeth Mensch for teaching me most of what I know about the uses of
history in legal thought; and to colleagues at the Buffalo and Wisconsin Law Schools
for showing in their work how the "historicist" perspective can transform one's under-
standing of law.
1. As used here, the elastic term "historicism" refers simply to the perspective that the
meanings of words and actions are to some degree dependent on the particular social and
historical conditions in which they occur, and to interpretations and criticisms that arc
suggested by that perspective. It is not intended to describe the view that meanings may
be derived exclusively by reference to the unique conditions of a specific time and place.
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pieces of work, but the process by which an intellectual dialogue has
risked impoverishment by repeatedly failing to listen or respond to
certain conversational moves.
I use "legal scholarship" to mean what might be called the main-
stream elite scholarship of this country, the work of the acknowledged
intellectual leaders of the profession. In the last century, before the
rise of a separate profession of law teachers, this scholarship would
have been that of the leading treatise-writers-Kent, Story, Greenleaf,
Sedgwick, Parsons, and so forth; afterwards, the scholarship would be
that of the writers of books and articles regularly cited or appearing
in the leading law reviews. This restriction to "mainstream" scholar-
ship is meant to exclude most of the work on law that emphasizes its
historicity, like professional legal history, legal sociology, and legal
anthropology; for the most part, this work is neither published nor
cited in the leading reviews. But this restriction does not exclude a
great deal of work done in other interdisciplinary modes; in particu-
lar, it includes the economic analysis of law and legal philosophy in
the Anglo-American tradition of Hart, Dworkin, and Rawls.
2
I. The Threat of Historicism
Mainstream legal scholarship thus defined seems to have three aims.8
The chief aim is that of rationalizing the real, of showing that the
law-making and law-applying activities that go on in our society make
sense and may be rationally related to some coherent conceptual or-
dering scheme. This task, which might be the theoretical attempt to
develop or refine the ordering schemes themselves, or simply an effort
to fit some specialized pattern of activity into already well-developed
schemes, could be approached in almost any spirit, from true agnos-
ticism about whether the real is rational to an assumption that it must
be. For most scholars, I would guess, the approach is predetermined
by the method: if one is doing legal scholarship at all, one is proceed-
ing as if the real were rational. The second aim goes beyond rationali-
zation to justification, because the basic ordering scheme is not inter-
esting to most legal scholars-even to those who go to some pains to
2. See Tushnet, Legal Scholarship: Its Causes and Cure, 90 YALE L.J. 1205 (1981).
3. In the belief that the following account will not be controversial, I have not tried
to document it. The skeptical reader is invited to test it out for herself by looking through
back numbers of any ten of what she would consider the leading law reviews. See Sum-
mary of Discussion of Historicism in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1060, 1060 (1981)
(confirmation of characterization by scholar at symposium) [hereinafter cited as Summary
of Discussion].
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characterize their method as positive and not normative4-unless the
scheme may be derived from or at least shown to be consistent with
some plausible conception of the good. Most writers doing "applied"
rather than "basic" scholarship will seek only to refine the already de-
veloped justifications of existing ordering schemes, rather than starting
from scratch every time. The third aim is a pragmatic one. Legal schol-
ars usually want to persuade their readers that rationalization and jus-
tification are practical exercises that will help advocates or policy-
makers decide how to act or refrain from acting in social life and how
to justify their actions publicly.
An intellectual exercise that satisfies all three of these criteria is
necessarily somewhat apologetic, in either a conservative or reformist
manner. The conservative reveals the hidden logical fit between what
already happens in society and the underlying normative explanatory
structure, then seeks to identify deviations or anomalies for the sake
of casting them out. The reformer usually points to a whole body of
ideas or practices that is out of line with the basic structure, but that
can, with appropriate revisions, be made to fit. This exercise is apolo-
getic because the assumption that existing practices are rational and
good, or may readily be made so by procedures and options currently
available to policymakers, tends to exclude consideration of other
possibilities, such as that the practices are irrational or bad beyond
the chance of correction save by fundamental change-in ways of think-
ing as well as in institutional design. In other words (to overstate some-
what): if the situation cannot be "fixed," it is not a "problem" for
the field at all.
The legal activity that is the subject of this scholarship takes place
in a society that exists in space and time. This society supplies ma-
terials to the rationalizing enterprise in several forms. The first might
be called "legal texts." These are the basic data of the field, the work-
product of legal agencies and of lawyers doing or anticipating busi-
ness before them, including cases, statutes, regulations, briefs, plead-
ings, indentures, deeds, settlement offers, negotiation arguments, advice
to clients, and so forth. A second is the "social context," data from the
social field in which the legal text is embedded. This could be the
"facts" of a dispute, the "social problem" inspiring statutory action,
the "difficulties of enforcement" of a tax levy or injunction, or the
referent for the word "chicken" in a contract. The third set of ma-
terials will be called the "normative context," which is the apparatus
4. See Michelman, Norms and Normativity in the Economic Theory of Law, 62 MINN.
L. Rzv. 1015, 1058-39 (1978).
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of normative conceptions to which ithe legal scholar tries to relate the
legal texts. Sometimes these conceptions can be derived from inspec-
tion of the texts alone. Sometimes they are imported from outside,
from perceptions of customary morality, historical tradition, political
economy, ordinary language, moral philosophy, and so forth. I trust
that no one will suppose that normative and social contexts are meant
to represent categories easily defined to be mutually exclusive.
Any use at all of these social materials, even pure doctrinal scholar-
ship that restricts its scope to legal texts, will expose the user to his-
toricist criticism. The critic will claim that the scholar has, in one way
or another, seriously distorted reality by failing to take adequate ac-
count of the social and historical contingency of the materials. 5 First,
and least interestingly, the critic may try to swamp the rationalizing
enterprise by emphasizing the bewildering and dense variety of the
data it tries to manipulate. The scholar will come to see his legal
texts as heaps of miscellaneous rubbish, and his attempts to sort them
out as empty reductionist formalism. Some of the Legal Realists did
have this experience,6 but it is not a common one among legal scholars.
A much more common experience is having to fend off the prob-
lems that arise because legal texts are "longitudinal" data, assembled
by the scholar from earlier times. Principles synthesized from such texts
are always open to the challenge that appeal to the old text is inap-
propriate because the social context has changed; the old text was
drawn to respond to conditions that no longer exist. Of course, critical
historicism at this level is itself part of the standard apparatus of legal
scholarship. It poses no serious threat to the enterprise as a whole if
kept on a tight leash, that is, if restricted to relatively trivial differ-
entiation between past and present ("there were no cars traveling at
60 m.p.h. in 1850"), which implies that, saving such details, past and
present are continuous. But historicism is dangerous whenever these
restraints are loosened, as one can see from the recent powerful as-
saults by John Ely and Paul Brest on constitutional interpretation
bound to textual language or the intentions of the drafters. Ely and
Brest break with convention in positing drastic discontinuities, not
only in social conditions and technologies, but in basic assumptions
about reality7-about racial inferiority, the horror of death, or the nec-
essary ineffectuality of judicial power.
5. Of course, legal scholarship is not unique in its vulnerability to this kind of criti-
cism. See T. KUHN, THE STRucTURE OF ScIENTIFIc REVOLUTIONS 1-3 (2d ed. 1970).
6. See G. GILMORE, THE AGEs OF AMEwCAN LAw 80-81 (1977) (discussing Wesley
Sturges's "intellectual nihilism").
7. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND Dis-musr 11-41, 45 (1980); Brest, The Misconceived
Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REv. 204, 220-21 (1980).
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The critic might go even further and make the case for discontinuity
by reconstituting the political language in which an old text was first
written. The old text will be rendered almost wholly archaic if it can
be shown to embody a set of conceptions-about human nature, prop-
erty, virtue, freedom, representation, necessity, causation, and so forth
-that was a unique configuration for its time and in some ways strik-
ingly unlike what we believe to be our own.8 One naturally thinks in
this connection of the remarkable recent work that has made the
thought of this country's founders enormously more intelligible by
locating its terminology and major preoccupations in a Whig "republi-
can" ideology with a foundation in Renaissance political thought.
The lawyer who turns to the best available perspectives on the think-
ing behind the American Constitution may find herself in the posi-
tion of the French humanist lawyers who hoped to uncover the uni-
versal basis for their own jurisprudence by freeing the Roman Corpus
Juris from medieval corruptions, and then did such thorough schol-
arly work as to persuade many of them of Rome's irrelevance. 10
Thus far, in this catalogue of perils, I have mentioned chaos and
irrelevance. Perhaps more disturbing is the possibility that the critic,
searching like the legal scholar for pattern and regularity in legal
materials, will uncover a pattern, but not one that the scholar would
wish to find. The critic might, for example, attempt to explain legal
texts as determined, in an important sense, by some contextual variable
such as the politics of a dominant class or temporarily dominant po-
litical coalition, the class affiliations of litigant parties or decisionmak-
ers, the psychological makeup of officials, or the logic of some long-
term historical trend, such as economic growth or the development of
internal contradictions in capitalism." Such explanations will frequent-
ly be advanced because both ideologues of right and left and scholars
8. See generally J. PococK, Languages and their Implications: The Transformation
of the Study of Political Thought, in PoLrrcs, LANGUAGE, AND TIME 3 (1971) (text must
be understood in context of mindset embodied in language of the time it was written);
Skinner, Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas, 8 Hisr. & THEORY 3 (1969)
(historian of ideas should uncover intended meaning of text by examining linguistic
context).
9. See, e.g., J. PococK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT 506-45 (1975); C. RoimNs, THE
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY COMMONWEALTHMAN 356-77. 385 (1959); G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF
THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 48-75 (1969); Dunn, The politics of Locke in England
and America in the eighteenth century, in JOHN LOCKE: PROBLEMS AND PExspEcrvs 45,
70-78 (J. Yolton ed. 1969).
10. See J. FRANKLIN, JEAN BODIN AND THE SIXTEENTH-CENTURY REVOLUTION IN THE
METHODOLOGY OF LAW AND HIsTORY S6-58 (1963).
11. See, e.g., C. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNrrED STATEs 152-88 (1913) (provisions of Constitution determined by distinct economic
interest groups and classes); L. FRIEDMAN, A HisroRY oF AMERICAN LAw 10 (1973) (American
legal development not autonomous but molded by economy and society).
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in other disciplines have a professional stake in generating them. They
are always a potential threat to the assumption that rationalizing legal
texts will be a practical means of realizing the social good through
law, because they seem to cast law, lawyers, and jurists in the hu-
miliating status of mere epiphenomena, or at best, of people whose
job it is to justify change brought about by forces over which they
have little control. Curiously enough, however, legal scholarship has
enthusiastically embraced certain kinds of social determinism. 12
More subtle threats than these determinisms arise out of explora-
tions of context that challenge the models of instrumental rationality
underlying both the liberal theory of law and the enterprise of legal
scholarship. These models assume that legal rules, if they are living
up to their potential, are both universalistic and efficacious. 13 Nobody
is bothered if the historicist questions this picture by pointing to specif-
ic laws that are selectively or ineffectively enforced: these examples
simply illustrate the "gap" between law on the books and in action,
the deviant practices that it is the function of legal scholars to ex-
tirpate.14 What is troubling to legal scholars is the sociology that
demonstrates systematic discontinuities between legal texts and their
contexts. There are many different ways of creating this sense of dis-
continuity. One is an anthropological approach, "legal pluralism,"
which demotes the legal order to the status of one subculture among
many, competing (and often losing) against many other sources of
normative order and coercive sanctions, especially the customary or-
ders of private associations.15 Viewed this way, legal forms may not
appear primary and universal, but seem only to express the ideology
of a particular official or professional group-lawyers, judges, members
of Congress, police officers, school administrators-the content of which
is determined by the group's strategy of self-aggrandizement, which
may include mystification, the pose of guarding traditional norms, the
12. See pp. 1028-33 infra (discussing adaptation theory).
13. See Trubek & Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on the
Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States, 1974 Wis. L. REv. 1062,
1070-74 (discussing paradigm of "liberal legalism').
14. On the "gap" and its functions in legal scholarship, see Abel, Law Books and
Books About Law, 26 STAN. L. REy. 175, 184-89 (1973), and Feeley, The Concept of Laws
in Social Science: A Critique and Notes on an Expanded View, 10 LAw & Soc'y REv.
497, 498-500 (1976).
15. See, e.g., M. Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms 3-4 (1979) (unpublished Disputes
Processing Research Program Working Paper, #1979-4, University of Wisconsin Law
School); Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM.
Soc. REv. 55, 62 (1963) (in many business transactions, law of contract and legal sanctions
play only a small role); Mayhew, Stability and Change in Legal Systems, in STABILITY
AND SOCIAL CHANGE 187, 188, 210 (B. Barber & A. Inkeles eds. 1971) (legal system cannot
exercise control over many autonomous social institutions and organizations).
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seizure of initiative from some other agency, or election to political
office. Alternatively, the embodiment of a norm in law may be a trib-
ute to its very ineffectiveness, the legal system being assigned the
role of expressing as pious hopes norms that no one expects ever to
be actualized.16 Conversely, norms that derive from sources other than
the state may be quite effectively enforced: in a society like ours, with
strong traditions of extralegal1 7 and antilegall8 ideologies, one cannot
even assert with confidence that the state has held a monopoly on le-
gitimate violence. What legal scholarship considers the normal case-
the law effective according to its announced terms and evident pur-
poses-is relegated to a subclass of events satisfying peculiar and rather
unusual social conditions.19
Other critics use evidence internal to the legal system to support
the thesis of discontinuity, showing, for example, that requirements
of procedure clutter every expression of substantive law with elaborate
conditions on the means of its application. Rules apparently intended
to create liabilities of B to A may submit A to painful assaults on
privacy and dignity, may put A to difficult and expensive proof, may
be conducted in a language difficult to understand and alien to A's
concerns, and may be enforced by an agency congenitally sympathetic
to B; such a rule will frequently end up anaking B stronger than ever.
Again, mainstream scholarship expects this result to happen some-
times, and even concedes that it happens in whole areas of law,20 but
does not admit that it will happen in the typical case.
Many more examples might be given. The point is that these types
of social investigation and historicist criticism are profoundly unset-
tling to the standard rationalizing modes because they suggest that the
contributions of texts to contexts are as likely to be harmful or futile
as beneficent or practical, for reasons that ordinary legal analysis seems
16. See, e.g., M. EDELMAN, THE Sviaouc USES oF Po.rrxcs 37-38, 47-49 (1964); J. Gus-
FIELD, SYMBOLIC CRUSADE 166-71 (1963).
17. See, e.g., J. REID, IN A REBu.Ixous SPIRIT 86-87 (1979); Maier, Popular Uprising
and Civil Authority in Eighteenth-Century America, 27 WILLIAM & MARY Q. 3, 21-33
(1970). Although both Maier and Reid argue that mob action during the American
Revolutionary period could be, and was, rationalized as lawful, that action was none-
theless at odds with officially constituted authority.
18. See A. HEIMERT, RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN MIND 179-82 passim (1966) (discuss-
ing colonial sources of evangelical antilegalism).
19. See Felstiner, Influences of Social Organization on Dispute Processing, 9 LAw
& Soc'Y REv. 63, 80-83 (1974); Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations
on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 95, 149-50 (1974); Griffiths, Is Law
Important? 54 N.Y.U. L. REv. 339, 369-74 (1979); Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy:
Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. REv. 29, 119.30.
20. To some extent administrative regulation and lower level criminal justice admin-
istration have been assigned a special status even in mainstream scholarship as examples
of persistent discontinuity between overt textual intentions and actual social operation.
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to keep beyond its field of vision. Perhaps more disturbingly, they
suggest that the legal text often may not be understood at all in terms
of its instrumental relation to a social context, but only as a sym-
bolic statement: a legitimating ideology, a utopian aspiration, or a
cultural ritual designed to define boundaries between social cleanli-
ness and defilement. In response, legal scholarship has developed theo-
ries of how law relates to society and to history that minimize these
threats to its enterprise.
This is not to say that most or even many legal scholars actually
feel threatened by criticism from the historicist perspective; far from
it.21 For one thing, the "applied" work of many middle-level scholars
is far enough away from organizing theoretical assumptions that they
would not be likely to see assaults on those assumptions as even rele-
vant, much less damaging. To generate the psychological experience
of a threat, the critic would first have to encourage such scholars to
articulate the theoretical structures they take for granted. For anoth-
er, the virtue of the "responsive modes" I am about to discuss is pre-
cisely that they provide a means to keep any sense of being threatened
at bay. This quality is well illustrated by the fact that, although my
argument as it has developed has tended to cast legal rationalism in
a conservative role, and empiricism and historicism in a subversive
and critical one, our experience has been largely the opposite. In the
past, legal history has on the whole served to bolster and reassure ex-
isting enterprises of legal scholarship2 2 and has required powerful
assistance from criticism of very different forms-for example, Ben-
tham's analytic demonstration of Blackstone's internal incoherence 23
or Tom Paine's radical fundamentalist attacks based on natural rights2 4
-to break up these cozy, historically based systems. Nonetheless, his-
toricist criticism, as I will argue, has also played a part in forcing ma-
jor shifts in legal scholarship. Indeed, historicist criticism is always
ultimately destabilizing to the enterprise. Hence the need for strong
defenses.
II. The Failure of the Responsive Modes
I will classify the responsive modes in four categories. The first
mode is denial that particular contexts of time and place are relevant
21. Barbara Black and others raised this point at the symposium. See Summary of
Discussion, supra note 3, at 1060.
22. See Horwitz, The Conservative Tradition in the Writing of American Legal History,
17 AM. J. LEGAL Hisr. 275, 276, 281 (1973).
23. See J. BENTHAM, A Comment on the Commentaries, in A COMMENT ON THE COM-
MENTARIES and A FRAGMENT ON GovERNMENT 1 (J. Burns & H. Hart eds. 1977).
24. See T. PAINE, RIGHTS OF MAN (2d ed. London 1791) (lst ed. London 1791).
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to the enterprise of legal rationalization. The second is Cartesianism,
the construction of drastically simplified models of social reality for
use in legal analysis. The third is embrace of context, or assimilation,
in such a way that social and historical contextualization seem to serve
rather than to subvert legal rationality. The fourth is resignation in
the face of social contingency and historical change.
Denial. The purest form of denial is to assert that legal reasoning's
exclusive concern should be to work out the relationship of legal
texts to a system of suprahistorical norms transcending time and space.
In this view, reason is, by definition, deduction from universals, not
induction from the temporary and contingent. This style of natural-
law thinking need not detain us. In the sixteenth and seventeenth cen-
turies, empirically and historically minded lawyers, among others,
helped to ensure its relegation to the margins of elite legal thought by
shifting the center of study to positive law-the specific legal practices
of actual societies-and by developing a self-consciously inductive meth-
od for deriving legal principles from experience. 25 Of course, natural-
law thinking has since remained vital, but I doubt that anyone would
claim that its pure form is any longer in the mainstream. To the ex-
tent it persists, it is almost always mixed with other modes.
The modern forms of denial are likely to stake out only limited
claims for the territory of suprahistorical norms. One example might
be the "originalist" view of the interpretation of the Federal Consti-
tution, which claims that at least some texts must be treated as if
they had a frozen, noncontingent meaning. For reasons already sug-
gested, this is an exceedingly difficult position to put into practical
operation. 20 Another example might be the view that many, though
not all, legal rules are technical, facilitative rules used to solve prob-
lems of a kind that might arise in any society (such as rules governing
the formalities of contract formation) and can therefore be expressed
in an abstract form to which any society at any point in its mutation
could plug in. Yet denial even in this form cannot successfully de-
fend the rationalizing enterprise. One of the standard, and most ef-
fective, historicist attacks made by the Realists on their "formalist"
predecessors involved the formalists' claims to have come up with
such rules. The supposedly purely technical schemes of offer-and-ac-
ceptance rules, for instance, were shown to be indefinitely manipula-
ble in theory to reach the results of "contract formed" or "no con-
tract formed" in any particular case, and to have been regularly
25. See W. GRUNLEA, Otrn, EMpmnciM, AND PoLITICs 142-205, 262-82 (1964); J.
Pococ, supra note 9, at 3-30.
26. Seep. 1020 supra.
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manipulated in practice to reach on. result or the other in situations
that could be distinguished only by close attention to social or eco-
nomic context.27
Cartesianism. The much more common modem strategy for keep-
ing distressing historicity at bay is what I call "Cartesianism": for-
mal modelling, the intellectual strategy of constructing highly sim-
plified models of social reality for the sake of analytic rigor and
elegance, in the manner of economic theory. The models are rela-
tively closed games. You cannot play unless you agree in advance to
a fairly explicitly specified set of rules about permissible moves. If
you change the rules-for example, by admitting a new empirical as-
sumption: the island people produce three goods, not just two, and
one person is given a gun-you should change only a few at a time
and only with advance notice. Cartesianism is a strategy midway be-
tween the denial and the embrace of social contingency: it admits
social variables, but only as members of a highly exclusive club, and
thus makes itself vulnerable to historicist attack only to the extent
it desires.
The legal formalism of the late nineteenth century was a Car-
tesian mode in this sense, because many of its practitioners viewed
the few core principles on which it was based as socially derived-
indeed, as given by history. But history was a subcontractor whose
job was finished once it' had laid the foundation of principles. The
rest of the structure was to be built strictly with such legal texts as
could be rationalized according to deductions from those principles,28
with allowances here and there for quirks of public policy. The Real-
ists had a lot of fun with these structures, pointing out the social
contingency of decisions and the policy choices made with the plac-
ing of every brick and board.29 Nonetheless, they too practiced, and
bequeathed to us, a quasi-Cartesian method of "policy analysis" that
employs a simple model. That model assumes that the rules of ap-
pellate doctrine are instantly incorporated in the incentive struc-
tures of individtials situated like the litigants, and takes the "facts"
as stated in the opinion, for the purpose of analyzing the effect of
rules, to represent the litigants' situation. For example: "Adoption
of the rule plaintiff wants would ... deter sellers from fraud, cause
27. See, e.g., Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35
COLUM. L. REv. 809, 83942 (1935); Llewellyn, On Our Case-Law of Contract: Offer and
Acceptance (pts. I & 2), 48 YALE L.J. 1, 779 (1938-1959).
28. See C. LANGDELL, A SUMMARY or THE LAW OF CoNiRAcr iv (2d ed. 1880) ("a con-
cise statement and exposition of the doctrines" developed in his pioneering casebook).
29. See pp. 1025-26 supra.
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them to charge higher prices, leave the market in disgust," and so forth.
Historicist critics have treated policy analysis harshly, though with
no apparent effect upon its incidence. The critics assert that because
of high litigation costs, cross-cutting regimes of social custom or domi-
nation, total lack of correspondence between the way the judge told
the story and the way the litigants experienced it, or the impracti-
cability of general enforcement, announcement of the rule is likely
to have no effect at all, or to have a completely unexpected one.30
Yet the vulnerability of Cartesian modes to the battery of historicist
criticisms naturally depends on the claims made for the theory. Sir
Henry Maine's famous objection to Austin's notion that law is the
command of a sovereign-that in many of the world's societies, past
and present, one could not find anyone looking like a sovereign issu-
ing anything looking like a command, because their members' habits
of obedience are overwhelmingly to orders of custom31-was beside
the point. Austin was not trying to describe any actual legal system,
just proposing a model to sharpen thinking about the idea of law
generally. But the moment that positivist theorists like Austin claim
the ability to resolve actual social controversies through a reasoning
process that is strictly internal to an autonomous legal order, relying
exclusively, for example, on the "core meanings" of authoritative le-
gal texts (rules), the historicist is entitled to point out that all lan-
guage is social, and all meaning contextual. 32 Similarly, modern policy
analysts might argue to their critics that the normative enterprise of
rationalizing doctrine is one that traditionally proceeds as if the model
were empirically valid, so that demonstrations that it is not are ir-
relevant.3 3 Further, if one wishes to converse with judges in their
rhetorical reasoning modes, one will adopt their simplifying assump-
tions, however fanciful they may seem. Yet few legal scholars are
willing to see their enterprise as simply one of working within tradi-
tional rhetorics. To the extent that, as problem-solvers, they must
claim that their models represent social reality well enough to be used
30. See, e.g., Macaulay, Elegant Models, Empirical Pictures, and the Complexities of
Contract, I1 LAw & Soc'Y lEv. 507, 508-10 (1977).
31. See H. MAINE, LErURES ON THE EARLY Hzsrony or INsriTuTioNs 357-65 (1888).
32. See p. 1021 supra; Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor
Hart, 71 HAv. L. REv. 630, 661-69 (1958).
33. Perhaps this answer is rarely given because it is so easily followed by the question:
"But if you are not seriously interested in instrumental effects, why do you use a rhetoric
of instrumental rationality?" This challenge requires a more complicated (and equally
rare) answer, perhaps: "At present instrumental rhetoric is the most legitimate and
persuasive."
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as a basis for decisionmaking, they - re fair game for their critics.34
Adaptation Theory. Even at the flood tide of formalism in American
legal scholarship, at the Harvard Law School of the 1870s and 1880s,
the scholars were committed as much to the project of synthesizing
legal principles from historical materials as to analytic schematization
of those principles. Like Austin himself, who had studied in Ger-
many and was convinced he was pursuing a genuine historical meth-
od,35 they were certain that the historical and analytic methods com-
plemented rather than conflicted with one another. In short, they had
found a way of accepting a relationship between legal texts and so-
ciety, but one seemingly free of historicist perils. This brings us to
the third and most important of the responsive modes, the notion
that there is an immanent rationality in social life, which it is the
business of legal rationalization to incorporate.
One way of embracing history, now rarely used explicitly, is as a
curator of timeless traditional wisdom or immemorial custom-the
norms of the ancient Gothic Constitution or those of 1787--which is
frequently violated in times of tyranny, but always there to be re-
affirmed once people come to their senses.36 Some versions of this
static view of the function of tradition have always been important
in our legal thought, 7 but only in combination with much more im-
portant dynamic views of history. Their exponents have kept up a
steady barrage of criticism against the static views without ever man-
aging to expel them entirely. The critical technique is simply to show
that the custom or ideal claimed to be immemorial has a specific or-
igin in the circumstances and thinking of a particular period, and
survived after it only as a result of inertia.38 The point of departure
for this kind of criticism is the adaptation theory of legal change, which,
84. Cf. Rizzo, The Mirage of Efficiency, 8 HoFsTRA L. REv. 641, 641-43 (1980) (models
of legal economics exclude too many variables to be useful).
35. See 2 J. AuSTIN, LEcTuREs ON JURISPRUDENCE 701-02 (4th rev. R. Campbell ed.
London 1873) (Ist ed. London 1861) (new material in Campbell edition taken from John
Stuart Mill's notes); Schwarz, John Austin and the German Jurisprudence of His Time,
I PoLITIcA 178 (1934).
36. See J. POcOCK, THE ANcIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAW 30-55 (1967)
(characterizing early 17th-century conception of common law as immemorial custom);
R. WELTER, THE MIND OF AMERICA, 1820-1860, at 26-44 (1975) (post-Revolutionary Ameri-
cans believed that they had transcended the "macrohistory" of the European old world,
and were to live in a "microhistory" in which the problem would be striving to live up
to norms already given by the national mission); cf. S. BERCOVITcH, THE AMERICAN JEE£-
mIAD 93-131 (1978) (discussing "America's Mission').
37. See T. JEFFERSON, Whether Christianity is Part of the Common Law? in I THE
WRIINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 1760-1775, at 360 (P. Ford ed. 1892).
38. See, e.g., J. BENwHAM, supra note 23, at 234-37; J. PococK, supra note 36, at 91-
123 (discussing work of Sir Henry Spelman).
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from its first full articulation (perhaps never since surpassed) by
Matthew Hale,39 has become central to our conventional ways of
thought.
Adaptation theorists sometimes say that the function of law is to
learn to recognize, or imitate, regimes of spontaneous order already
present in social life. Thus, legal rationalization is nothing more than
a means to promote accurate encoding of these orders of custom, or
"living law." Sometimes they express the role of law more actively,
saying that it is a kind of problem-solving technology that responds,
or adapts, to "needs" emerging from society. Then the tasks of legal
rationalization are to help identify those needs and to improve the
adaptive technology. In this century, these views have probably more
often been expressed in legal scholarship as a set of vague background
assumptions, seemingly too obvious to need any elaboration, than as
a full-fledged theory. Blackstone and Adam Smith, both pioneering
adaptation theorists, did not shirk the task of trying to spell out in
some detail their notions of the adaptive relationship between legal
forms and social change,40 but despite the inspiration that the work
of Maine, Vinogradoff, and Weber 4l might have provided, their suc-
cessors have been uninterested, with only rare exceptions, 42 in trying
to develop any systematic social theory of legal change. Thus, when
scholars say, as in recent mainstream scholarship they frequently do,4 3
39. See Hale, Considerations Touching the Amendment or Alteration of Lawes, in 1
A COLLECTION OF TRACTS RELATIvE To THE LAW OF ENGLAND 249 (F. Hargrave ed. Dublin
1787). Describing the dangers of "over much hastiness in changing of old lawes, and
introducing of new," he writes:
It is most certain, that time and long experience is much more ingenious, subtile
and judicious, than all the wisest and acutest wits in the world co-existing can be
.... So that in truth antient lawes, especially, that have a common concern, are not
the issues of the prudence of this or that council or senate, but they are the produc-
tion of the various experiences and applications of the wisest thing in the inferior
world; to wit, time, which as it discovers day after day new inconveniences, so it
doth successively apply new remedies; and indeed it is a kind of aggregation of the
discoveries, results and applications of ages and events ....
Id. at 253-54.
40. See 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 01-15 (discussing development of legal in-
stitution of property); A. SMITH, LECTuRs ON JURISPRUDENCE 13-76, 200-92 (R. Meek, D.
Raphael, & P. Stein eds. 1978) (relating different modes of acquiring property to hunting,
pastoral, agricultural, and commercial stages of social development, and relating different
forms of government to same stages).
41. See H. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW (London 1861); P. VINOCRADOFF, OUTLINES OF HIS-
TORICAL JURISPRUDENCE (2 vols.) (1920-1922); M. WEER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (2 vols.) (G.
Roth & C. Wittich eds. 1968).
42. See notes 134-39 infra (citing recent work of legal scholars in tradition of Weber).
43. Adaptation theory is so pervasive in the scholarship of the past two centuries that
it would be a challenge to find work in which it was not present. For representative
modern examples of adaptationism, see B. CARDOZO, THE GRowTH OF THE LAW (1924),
Keeton, Creative Continuity in the Law of Torts, 75 HARv. L. REv. 463, 484 (1962), and
pp. 1037-45 infra (discussing legal thought of Whigs and Progressives).
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that law has changed, or should chauige, to meet social needs, they do
not usually feel that they have to specify what a "social need" is, or
how the particular needs they refer to originated and have changed
over time.44
No matter how loosely they may define their basic concepts, all adap-
tation theorists must find some way to distinguish adaptive from mal-
adaptive law. The easiest solution to this problem is Hale's and Burke's
notion of prescriptive experience, which, in an extreme Panglossian
form to which neither Hale nor Burke ever subscribed, holds that
whatever law exists is on that account presumptively adaptive.4 5
Though possibly the most coherent of all the adaptation theories, this
one has very little charm for legal scholars, who would have nothing
to do if it were valid, and who usually want very much to reject some
aspects of the present order. Legal scholars frequently ask, when mov-
ing toward evaluation, whether legal interventions in social processes
follow the natural grain of such processes or artificially cut across it
-naturalness, naturally, being adaptive, and artificiality, maladaptive.
This move may be made through a procedural theory of institutional
competence, a substantive theory of social processes, or some combi-
nation of the two.
The procedural theorist asserts at his crudest that some kinds of law-
making are per se adaptive, others just as automatically maladaptive.
In our scholarly tradition, the assignment of these roles has repeatedly
switched back and forth between judges and legislatures, though it
occasionally gravitates elsewhere, especially to juries and administra-
tive agencies. Adjudication, for instance, has sometimes been thought
to be relatively naturally adaptive because case law, being fact-bound,
can simply track social custom in the rich particularity of its form in
specific controversies, whereas legislation is necessarily general in form
and hence abstract. 4" Alternatively, adjudication is natural because
judges possess, through their technical training in case law, vicarious
experience of the order of custom, whereas legislators must rely upon
the necessarily parochial and limited materials of personal experience
or the claims pressed upon them by lobbyists.47 Most recently, the ar-
44. Utilitarian legal theory and the current law-and-economics movement have, of
course, formulated more or less rigorous theories of the relationship of legal texts to
individual wants. But these theories are not, and usually do not pretend to be, social
theories, because the social conditions in which preferences arise are treated as exogenous.
45. See J. PococK, Burke and the Ancient Constitution: A Problem in the History of
Ideas, in PoLITics, LANGUAGE, AND TIME 202, 215-28 (1971).
46. See Carter, The Ideal and the Actual in the Law, 13 A.B.A. REP. 217, 231-36 (1890).
47. See Pound, The Econonic Interpretation and the Law of Torts, 53 HAiV. L. REv.
365, 366 (1940).
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gument has surfaced that common law adjudication, for reasons as
yet only suspected but having perhaps to do with the survival power
of precedents preferred by litigants, 48 seems to produce economically
efficient results, whereas legislation is easily captured by special in-
terests to defeat the immanent rationality of the market.49 On the
other hand, the simple case for legislative naturalness, if one is will-
ing to equate "social needs" with "the prevailing political consensus
of desires," is that legislation is the outcome of majoritarian processes;
if one is not so willing, the case is that legislative committees have
more time and expertise than judges to inquire deeply into the social
order. A more complex case is that legislation better represents the
governing coalitions of "minorities rule." The late Alexander Bickel,
for example, ascribed Burkean naturalness to the push and pull of
the struggles and compromises of corporate interest groups engaged in
pluralist political bargaining. With this lush jungly background of
striving and decaying organic lives he contrasted the artificial activity
of adjudication. Adjudication, he argued, is artificial precisely because
of the duty of principled reasoning, which, like any abstractly rational
design, if extended beyond its appropriate sphere may have unexpected
tragic or ironic consequences to the delicate jungle ecology.50
Few people are content, however, to rest adaptation theory entirely
on the naturally adaptive processes of any single institution. Hale, our
prototype theorist, immediately follows his argument that laws should
not be rashly amended (because they are presumptively adapted to
spontaneous order) with a list of reasons why they should be prudent-
ly amended:5 1 like Burke, he was a reformer. Spontaneous order has
a way of becoming very disorderly. Old texts may be carried into new
contexts from insufficient litigation or from force of professional habit,
so that the emergence of new rules to meet new needs is stunted. Al-
though presumed to be fundamentally sound, any legal system may
develop complexities and anomalies that defeat its own ends, but it
may be restored to adaptive capacity through moderate reform, that
is, through the deployment of some self-consciously rational equili-
brating mechanism. With the theory so qualified, all that is needed
is a procedural theory of appropriate equilibrating mechanisms. Hale's
48. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL
STUD. 65, 68 (1977). But see Priest, Selective Characteristics of Litigation, 9 J. LEGAL STUD.
399, 410 (1980) (addition of new variable to model employed in earlier article causes
significant revision in conclusions).
49. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 404-05 (2d ed. 1977).
50. A. BicKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 173-78 (1970).
51. Hale, supra note 39, at 264-71.
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own is a common one: see first whit may be done through the judi-
ciary and have only last resort to the legislature.5 2 Similarly, if one
is a partisan of legislative naturalness, one may advise primary reli-
ance on statutory law-making, subject to correction for gross defect by
judicial constitutional review. Most legal writers, of course, have fa-
vored multi-tiered systems, in which juries, trial judges, appellate
judges, the common-law process, codification by experts, legislation,
administration, and judicial review are each given roles both of natu-
ral adaptation and of corrective equilibration for different purposes.
To a procedural adaptation theorist, the only valid object of ra-
tionalist reform is repair of the natural processes: anything more
would be maladaptive intervention. Yet it is a rare scholar who is
able to play the game indefinitely-identifying natural mechanisms
subject to occasional interruptions for repair by rational ones-without
at some point mentioning substantive criteria of adaptability. 3 Once
one has gone so far as to distinguish natural from artificial processes
and good from bad reforms, one probably has at least some covert
substantive notions of what in social life law should adapt to, and
what it should promote, restrain, and avoid. One way to identify
natural processes and good reforms is simply to make a list of social
needs, as banal as you like-for example, political stability, personal
security, or maintaining the market.54 Another way is to infer a list
of needs from existing law: to hypothesize that every legal text re-
sponds to some need, and then simply to guess what that need might
be.55 However one identifies the needs, the next step is to evaluate
how effectively current law serves the need; if it does not, it should
be reformed. But this method will get you nowhere without some way
to tell current from obsolete needs, since by hypothesis every text re-
sponds to some need; what is called for is a theory of social change,
or historical direction, that truly adaptive law must follow, and by
following which it may be identified. Indeed, the social functionalism
of our legal tradition is almost invariably tied to a theory of social-
legal development, generally (with some lapses and variations) a theory
52. Id. at 272.
53. Cf. Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of
Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1104 (1981) (legal theory can-
not avoid making substantive choices); Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based
Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1064 (1980) (process approach indeterminate
if not informed by theory of substantive rights and values).
54. Surely the longest such list on record is Dean Pound's delineation of individual
and societal interests in 3 R. POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 25-324 (1959).
55. This "technique" is nothing more than our accustomed method of classroom
"policy analysis."
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of progressive development like "modernization," "Whig history," or
"legal evolution," which simultaneously licenses most existing law as
adaptive and permits historicist criticism of some of it as maladaptive-
ly "lagging" behind the course of history.50
This discussion must seem a painfully labored journey to arrive at
a familiar destination. I have proceeded this way to emphasize that
some notion of historical direction seems to be required by any adap-
tation theory of law that goes beyond the purely prescriptive. For all
their ingenuity in meeting historicist criticism through partial assimi-
lation, however, adaptation theorists actually remain highly vulner-
able to it, because the theory's coherence depends on its ability to tell
functional from dysfunctional law. This ability can be questioned in
several ways.
One attack is the conservative's reductio that the rule claimed to
be obsolete may actually be fulfilling a valuable, if latent, social func-
tion-for example, Blackstone argued that the bizarre quiddities and
fictions of the writ system had freed the English land law from feudal
restraints57-so that the rule is tampered with at the reformer's peril.
The latent function might be precisely that of preserving the authority
and legitimacy of the legal system by presenting it to the masses as
an historical fait accompli. Once they have the idea of reform, there
is no telling what they may do. The usual response is that a little
reform will keep them quiet, but that none at all will enrage them.58
A non-conservative variant of this attack has been developed by
Lawrence Friedman, who argues that all current law, even what looks
like anomalous "survivals," exists for a reason and may be explained
by reference to some current social reality. If a rule has not changed
for a long time, one should ask why not, and one may often find the
answer in a deadlock actively brought about by some clash of interest
groups.50 This perspective absorbs law completely into a determining
context by collapsing social "needs" into "interests": law adapts all
right, but only to whatever interests happen to get control of it. This
view also undermines the normative force of adaptation theory. After
all, what could be so wonderful about a law perfectly adapted to the
needs of a slave civilization?0
56. See pp. 103745 infra (discussing theories of Whigs and Progressives).
57. See 3 W. BLAcmoNE, supra note 40, at 0193-97.
58. See Hay, Properly, Authority, and the Criminal Law, in D. HAY, P. LINEBAUGH,
J. RULE, E. THOMPSON, & C. WINSLOW, ALBION's FATAL TaM 17, 24-26 (1975).
59. See L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 10, 14; Friedman & Ladinsky, Social Change
and the Law of Industrial Accidents, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 50. 65, 72, 76 (1967).
60. Austin made this point very effectively against Blackstone's cxaltation of custom:
During the Middle Ages, the body of the people, throughout Europe, were in the
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A second attack comes from exactly the opposite direction. Many
legal texts cannot be explained, and therefore justified, on the ground
that they are functional adaptations: they are chronically maladapted
to the manifest functions claimed for them.01 Nor may they be ex-
plained away as "gaps," "lags," or "anomalies": they have almost
never worked the way they are supposed to.62 Such texts can be ra-
tionalized only as performing latent functions, which destroys the
adaptive/maladaptive boundary.
Adaptation theory's dualism between a "society" that has "needs"
and a "legal system" that responds to them can also be attacked. Even
if one takes adaptationism in its most romantic form, law unconscious-
ly encodes the customary Zeitgeist in a legal text, placing it on the
new grid of a professionally interpreted map of texts, and thereby
alters its meaning forever. Moreover, by encoding custom, law trans-
mits it to people in other places and times, and thus acts positively
to reproduce the custom (in its altered legal form), and not just pas-
sively to reflect it. The "society" that keeps throwing up new needs,
therefore, is always partly constituted by its laws, which are helping
to make the social needs to which the law-makers pretend only to
adapt. Pointing out this kind of circularity was a favorite exercise of
the Progressive critics of legal formalism. For example, the Supreme
Court said that public utility rate-making was confiscatory unless the
rate allowed the utility a reasonable return on the fair value of its
property,63 but of course "fair value" was itself a function of the rate
the Court was willing to say was reasonable.
0 4
Circularity turned out to be as big a problem for the Progressive
jurists, who wanted their law to adapt to the "social facts" of its con-
text instead of to the arid logical consistency worshipped (as they
serf or slavish condition. And this slavish condition of the body of the people
originated in custom: Although the imperfect rights which custom gave to their
masters, together with the imperfect obligations which custom imposed on them-
selves, were afterwards enforced by Law of which that custom was the basis . ...
Let us turn our eyes in what direction we may, we shall find that there is no
connection between customary law, and the well-being of the many.
2 J. AusTIN, supra note 35, at 559-60.
61. See A. WATSON, SOCIETY AND LEGAL CHANGE 7-8, 130-37 (1977). In this very in-
teresting book, Watson accepts the basic tenet of adaptation theory that societies have
needs to which their laws should respond, but says that legal systems chronically lag
behind such needs, copiously illustrating this claim with examples from Roman and
English law.
62. See pp. 1022-23 supra (discussing demonstrations of discontinuity between texts
and contexts).
63. See Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 526, 546-47, decree modified, 171 U.S. 361 (1898).
64. See J. DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW IN THE
UNITED STATES 221-26 (1927).
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thought) by their predecessors. Yet the "facts" as stated in a case or
in a legislative history that describes the social situation to which the
legal text is to respond are also in part artifacts of the legal system.
If the story were differently told, it would suggest different solutions. 5
The critic can further generalize the point, showing how legal texts
participate in the construction of the social world, populating it with
creatures of law's own devising, abstract self-determining individuals
and artificial corporate persons, ascribing "interests" to them and de-
ciding when their sufferings are recognizable "harms."60
This last line of criticism suggests a fourth. The social needs usually
postulated, besides being partly a construct of the legal system rather
than somehow objectively present in society apart from law, are fre-
quently in contradiction with one another.0 7 For example, American
lawyers of the nineteenth century liked to assert that a main function
of law was to protect security in possession and certainty in exchange
at the same time that it fostered capital accumulation; they found in
practice, however, that they had constantly to choose among these
purposes, so that the actual social need served was that of mediating
these conflicts by dressing up doctrinal formulae in traditional lan-
guage to obscure the fact that some people's security and certainty
were being promoted at the expense of others', e8 Interestingly, like
other latent functions, this important one is given scant attention in
the ordinary scholarly literature.
Finally, the critic can attack the assumptions about the course of
history underlying adaptation theory. She can, for example, show that
the directional histories are simply wrong. The assumptions of the
evolutionary histories of nineteenth-century jurists, especially the as-
sumptions of necessary stage developments in all-at least all "pro-
gressive"-societies from communalism toward individualism, and sta-
tus to contract, were, as Peter Stein has recently reminded us,69 broken
65. See, e.g., Danzig, How Questions Begot Answers in Felix Frankfurter's First Flag
Salute Opinion, 1977 Sup. CT. REV. 257, 258 (1978) (Justice Frankfurter reached opposite
conclusions in similar cases by "differential focusing"). An excellent recent treatment
of "fact-skepticism" is found in Casebeer, The Judging Glass, 33 MIAMI L. REV. 59,
98-118 (1978).
66. See, e.g., A. NfKAM, THE PERSONALITY CONCEF'rION OF THE LEGAL ENTITY 116-24
(1938); J. NOONAN, PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW 14-25 (1976); J. VINING, LEGAL IDEN-
TrY 20-33 (1978); Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and Ideology in
the Coase Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L. REv. 669, 695-96 (1979).
67. This argument is generalized in Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Cominen.
taries, 28 BUFFALO L. REv. 209, 354-72 (1979).
68. See, e.g., M. Honwrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 31-
62 (1977); Scheiber, Property Law, Expropriation, and Resource Allocation by Govern-
ment: the United States, 1789-1910, 33 J. ECON. HST. 232, 240.43 (1973).
69. P. STEIN, LEGAL EVOLUTION 107-21 (1980). This book might have been entitled
A brief and lucid history of adaptation theory in nineteenth century England.
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up by historicist critics who found that even English legal develop-
ment had skipped stages or gone through them in reverse order 70
I have given a lot of attention to adaptation theory because under
one name or another-expediency, convenience, utility, growth, devel-
opment, modernization, historical or sociological jurisprudence, the
functional approach, social engineering, policy analysis, efficiency, or
responsive law-it has been a component of virtually all the majo-
movements of Anglo-American juristic writing, and has been a com-
mon element cutting across otherwise violent controversies between
schools. That is, the idea that law is good if it dynamically adapts to
social change is the same idea whether the writer gives priniary em-
phasis to naturally adaptive procedures or to consciously adaptive equi-
librating mechanisms; it is also, I believe, vulnerable to the same
criticisms. Even theories that at first sight look like pure denial, claim-
ing that legal rationality is not historically contingent, often turn out
to be historicist adaptationism in disguise. The idea that the purpose
of law is to realize in society certain universally valid norms is often
tied to a notion of historical development by which the good norms
-individual liberty against the state, political equality, freedom of
contract, or mixed government, for example-are known to be good
because they have been gradually and progressively realizing them-
selves in history, or because they have been evolving into their present
highly developed forms from inferior ones.71 The idea that law should
adapt to follow or promote its dynamically unfolding normative con-
text does not seem to me essentially different from the ideal of adap-
tation to social context.
Resignation. The last of the responsive modes, resignation, is not
really a theory but a set of attitudes. Legal rationality, say the re-
signed, is only an existential affirmation of order in the midst of
nothingness. It satisfies human cravings for meaning and it nourishes
myths bolstering the (impliedly necessary and desirable) cohesion of
society or the authority of the state. In weaker versions, the resigned
admit that legal institutions, like all human works, are naturally im-
perfect, are always, because of historical contingency, out-of-date, and
are inevitably, because of social complexity, problematic in their ef-
fects; but that's life. In yet another version, the concession is that all
our rationalizing activity is tentative and provisional, all our ideas
of the good possibly parochial, but the best that we happen to know.
70. See I F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HIsroRY OF ENGLISH LAW 627-34, 654-57,
670-88 (1895) (discussing the "individualism" of early English village communities).
71. See, e.g., Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV. L. REV. 97, 113 (1908) (law has de-
veloped through six centuries toward closer "harmony with moral principles').
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No very definite or systematic patterns are likely to emerge from our
inquiries, so we must be content to work out the seemingly pragmatic
best solutions case by case.
This attitude is extraordinarily difficult to isolate for discussion be-
cause, like denial, it is hardly ever found in pure form, although it
is pervasively sprinkled through legal writing72 and is more of a mood,
or tone of voice, than anything one can really grasp. Its strangeness
is that while seeming in every way to concede the historicist critics'
case, its actual deployment is to justify the orthodox practice of main-
stream rationalizing rather than to incorporate the critics' perspec-
tive. The effect is like a move in judo: the resigned scholar uses the
critics' strength to flip them on their backs and meanwhile keeps
doing what he did before. But why, if he recognizes the limitations
of his methods? If he sees that current norms and practices are his-
torically contingent, why does he continue writing as if they were
natural and necessary? If he is perfectly aware, as he claims he is,
that law rarely really works the way it is supposed to, why does he
continue to contribute to a style of rationalizing scholarship that ac-
cepts at face value an idealized instrumental view of the role of law
in society? More generally, if our conventional styles of rationalization
are compelled neither by suprahistorical norms nor by the logic of his-
tory-nor even by a Cartesian model around which the discipline is
organized-why don't we do something else?
III. The Persistence of Old Modes: Whigs and Progressives
We don't, though. The old modes persist. One way to read the his-
tory of our legal thought is as a succession of mixings of the main
responsive modes into-"paradigms" is too pretentious, "systems" too
suggestive of system-amalgams that command the allegiance of most
of the orthodox until they come under attack and are demolished by
historicist criticism, among other kinds. But such criticism is strictly
limited in its impact by the regrouping, like white cells, of the same
old responsive modes into another amalgam uncannily like the one
recently demolished.
Let me try briefly to illustrate how this process has worked through
a summary account of how the amalgam put together by American
antebellum legal writers came under historicist fire around the be-
ginning of our own century, and was then replaced by another and
similar amalgam that has dominated our scholarship until very recently.
72. Resignation occasionally surfaces as the dominant mood in the work of some
writers-for example, Holmes, Thurman Arnold, and, more recently, Calvin Woodard
and Grant Gilmore.
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The principal contributors to whrit Morton Horwitz has called the
"treatise tradition," 73 the early nineteenth century's closest analogue
to modem legal scholarship, were an elite of primarily Federalist and
Whig lawyers74 anxious to vindicate an ambitious conception of their
political role in the new American republic. This role was linked to
the enlarged importance of the judiciary in the Federalist scheme, by
which the people had delegated governmental authority not simply
to representative assemblies but to a complexly interacting system of
separated powers, the functioning of each of which was critical to
the schenie as a whole. As a result, the state and federal judiciaries,
through their authority to say what the law was, were able to claim
and to acquire the authority to interpret the fundamental law of the
constitutions.75 Moreover, partly by default of available alternatives,
partly by astute political suppression of alternatives occasionally pro-
posed, the profession was able to secure to the federal and state ju-
diciaries, assisted by a learned elite of leaders of their respective bars,
the principal responsibility for expounding and developing an Ameri-
can law of private rights."6 To justify their maintaining this position,
these judges and lawyers appealed to their command of a body of
legal learning and techniques for working with it ("legal science")
that, they said, could guarantee liberty and property far more reliably
than its competitors, the temporary whimsies of factional legislative
coalitions or the untutored non-lawyer's intuitions about natural rights.
A potential embarrassment to this claim lay in the fact that English
law was the chief component of traditional legal learning. The Revo-
lution had transformed this law into an alien system and one vul-
nerable to the savage historicist criticism that it was honeycombed
by the feudal and superstitious corruptions of centuries, of which, de-
spite progress, "much of the domineering spirit"7 7 still remained. Feel-
ing obliged to disentangle their science from its disreputable past
while preserving its traditional authority, the Whig-Federalist lawyers
deployed against their historicist and natural-rights critics a dazzling
array of responsive modes.
73. See M. Hoawnz, supra note 68, at 257-58 (contributors to this tradition included
Chancellor Kent, Joseph Story, and Joseph Angell).
74. Joseph Story is included in this category, see note 73 supra, although of course
he started his career as a Jeffersonian.
75. See G. WOOD, supra note 9, at 453-65.
76. Radical reformers in Pennsylvania, for example, "denounced the legal profession,
the common law, and the idea of an independent judiciary." R. ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN
CRIsIs 161-64 (1971). Nevertheless, the bar was able to preserve the judiciary's role. See
G. GAWALT, THE PROMISE OF POwER 81-118 (1979).
77. J. ADAMS, A dissertation on the Canon and the Feudal Law, in I PAPERS OF JOHN
ADAMS 103, 127 (R. Taylor, M. Kline, & G. Lint eds. 1977).
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One, a denial on which they could expect general agreement, was
the response that the common law contained certain suprahistorical
principles of fundamental law-either the immemorial norms of the
ancient Gothic constitution as finally revindicated through historical
struggle or simply principles expressive of the law of nature78-which
Americans had asserted as their birthright in the Revolution and
whose best guarantee was adoption of a system known to contain them.
This position was undercut somewhat by the elevation of the best
known of these principles into written constitutions and bills of rights.
The modes that turned out to be most useful were the several vari-
eties of adaptationism. One was prescriptive adaptationism, the argu-
ment that the common law was a vast Hale-like repository of collec-
tive experience about what ordinary people and wise judges have
thought to be useful customs and norms in concrete circumstances.79
A second was procedural adaptationism-judge-made case law had the
flexibility to change with changing circumstances. This mode was
accompanied by a dash of resignation. Because human actions were
infinite in their variety and constantly in flux, and legal texts were
constantly changing their meaning in new contexts, it was futile and
vain to hope to achieve certainty in the law by capturing a rule in a
legislative phrase or code. Yet this argument for the constant neces-
sity of reinterpreting texts did not remain a pessimistic one about the
indeterminacy of legal language; it quickly became an affirmative ar-
gument in favor of entrusting the job of reinterpretation to those
specially trained in the science of finding the one "true sense," in the
new context, of the old text.8 0 Third, the Whig-Federalist lawyers
had resort to equilibrating mechanisms. Lawyers conceded over and
over again to their critics that the common law was full of feudal
excrescences, silly fictions, and parochially English customs and inven-
tions. But Americans, implicitly at the beginning of the colonial set-
tlements and explicitly by the terms of the "reception" statutes, had
adopted the common law only insofar as it met their needs and con-
ditions,81 giving a valuable discretion to their judges to dispense with
78. See G. WooD, supra note 9, at 9-10' (discussing the blending of the ideas that
common-law rights were justified because they had "existed from time immemorial"
and because they embodied natural law).
79. See J. WILSON, Lectures on Law, in I VOMs OF JAMES WILSON 204-07 (Phila-
delphia 1804), for a typical rhapsody in this key.
80. See F. LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS 86 (enlarged ed. Boston 1839).
81. See Van Ness v. Pacard, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 137, 144-45 (1829) (Story, J.) (court should
not assume, absent authoritative state ruling, that state law includes common-law doc-
trine that fixtures become part of freehold, because doctrine might have proven not ap.
plicable to wilderness conditions); M. HoRwrrz, supra note 68, at 24-27.
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or vary English precedent. Furthernore, the response continued, Eng-
land herself had shown what could be accomplished by way of ju-
dicial reform, through the example of Lord Mansfield's selective im-
portation of international commercial law, and more recent judges'
use of European civilian writers, to "expand with the exigencies of
society," and to suit the "business of a nation increasing in wealth
and commerce, and connecting itself with the interests of all the
world."8 2 Evolutionary adaptation was a fourth mode. Despite all its
historical archaisms and positive abuses maladaptively implanted dur-
ing corrupt regimes, the long-term trend of the common law had been
a progressive development-for example, away from feudal restraints
on alienation, toward a liberal commercial policy 3-in directions en-
tirely compatible with American republicanism.
By these means and others, legal science was related to something
more fundamental than mere politics: to principles of fundamental
right as realized teleologically through historical experience and, even
more important, to needs spontaneously emerging from social life and
to the long-term logic of historical development.
The jurists who put together the "formalist" or "classical" legal
schemes of the late nineteenth century did not materially differ in
ambitions or assumptions from their antebellum predecessors, though
of course their methods were very much more systematic. They be-
lieved that the common law had gradually been ridding itself of the
archaisms and anomalies preventing its systematization, and was now
at the point where, with appropriate rationalizing attention from schol-
ars and law reformers, more and more of its parts might be subsumed
under principles of ever greater generality.8 4 In other words, pushed
along by scientific lawyers, the common law had been evolving toward
ever-increasing generality and internal consistency, creating as it did
so an ever larger scope for individual autonomy. Thus, in most cases
historical study of the origins and development of a legal rule, which
should reveal the relation of that rule to an enduring principle (or
else that, having no such relation, the rule was only an anachronistic
82. J. STORY, Growth of the Commercial Law, in MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS OF JOSEPH
STORY 262, 279 (W. Story ed. Boston 1852).
83. See, e.g., 3 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERCAN LAW 401-13 (New York 1828)
(tracing evolution from feudal to allodial estates in land); 4 id. at 433-37 (New York
1830) (tracing development of free alienability of land).
84. See, e.g., J. DILLON, THE LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE OF ENGLAND AND AMERICA 316-89
(1894); Ames, supra note 71, at 103, 113; cf. Holmes, Codes, and the Arrangement of the
Law, 5 Am. L. REv. 1, 1-2 (1870) (proposing a system for classification and codification
of common law that would inform law's future development).
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survival), should be a method complementary to analytic derivation
of the rule from a principle; they should arrive at the same result.85
Where the results did not coincide, the historical version should be
sacrificed, usually on the grounds that it resulted from a textual mis-
reading by some judges in the chain, which had interfered with its
proper evolutionary course, and that clarity and certainty in the ana-
lytic system required its excision. In this way the apparently Cartesian
abstraction of classical legal science could be seen as responsive both
to the current social need for precise definitions of the scope and lim-
its of autonomous conduct and to the long-run course of history.
Hence the classical scheme made itself vulnerable to historicist at-
tack. The main features of the attack are familiar enough not to re-
quire more than a quick summary: 80 (1) The model of evolution from
"status to contract" underlying classical-legal individualism was over-
simplified and distorted. (2) Even if it were correct, evolution had
not stopped; if England were taken as the model, modem societies had
left individualism behind and entered a new stage of "collectivism." ' T
(3) Moreover, said Holmes, giving evolutionism a new Darwinian
twist, there is no reason why the struggle to survive should not take
the form of a struggle to capture the state and make it legislate in
one's favor. Judicial intervention while the struggle continues is an
arbitrary taking of sides because truly adaptive law can come about
only when the winners are clear.a8 (4) The norms that classical jurists
assert as absolute principles immanent in the law are in fact only
specific and rather parochial ideologies of certain elites. ("The Four-
teenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Stat-
ics."89) (5) The formalist scheme is dysfunctional because it tries to
freeze these ideologies in the law, while social development requires
the recognition of new needs.90 (6) The scheme is totally nonfunctional
85. Ames's work typifies the combined historic.analytic method as practiced by a master.
See, e.g., J. AMES, Two Theories of Consideration, in LEcTruEs ON LEGAL HISTORY 323
(1913); J. AMES, The Doctrine of Price v. Neal, in LEcTURES ON LEGAL HISTOxY 270, 284
(1913).
86. See pp. 1027-28 supra.
87. See A. DICEY, LEcrtuREs ON THE RELATION BErWEEN LAW & PUBLIC OPINION IN
ENGLAND DUIUNG THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 299-301 (1905).
88. See Vegelahn v. Guatner, 167 Mass. 92, 105-06, 44 N.E. 1077, 1080 (1896) (Holmes,
J., dissenting); 0. HoLMEs, Law and the Court, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPEtS 291, 294-95
(1920).
89. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75-76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
90. See Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454, 454 (1909) (in holding that
liberty of contract is infringed by any legislation that disrupts the equal rights of em-
ployers and employees, the courts persisted in applying "an academic theory of equality
in the face of practical conditions of inequality').
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because its abstract formulations ca-) be manipulated to serve any in-
terest whatever. 91
Implicit, of course, in all these criticisms was an emerging theory
of genuinely adaptive law. Indeed, when this critical generation of
"Progressives" came to build their own amalgam, most of its emphasis
was on adaptation. In Progressive theory, speaking very generally, so-
cial needs assert themselves through "interests." 92 Interests are the
desires of individuals, but also the programs or aims of concrete social
groups in particular relations (bankrupts and creditors, consumers and
manufacturers, union members and employers, small stockholders and
management) as well as the generally shared purposes of the society
as a whole. Interests conflict. The object of law, then, is to ascertain
what interests exist, to decide which ones deserve recognition, and to
achieve an efficient adjustment of them, approximating their ideal
harmonization in the "public interest." Unlike the formalists, who
sought to restrict all lawmaking agencies within carefully bounded
spheres, the Progressives had no fixed institutional notion of adapta-
tion, preferring to allocate the workload according to perceived com-
petence to adapt because of expertise, enforcement capability, and so
forth. While presuming as an initial matter that when the legislature
speaks it is adequately harmonizing interests, they also designed an
active adaptive role for courts, both as trackers of custom and as so-
cial engineers.
Of special interest to our topic are the ways in which the Progres-
sive scholars, sometimes through exceptionally distinguished historical
work, located their own enterprise in time. Pound and Llewellyn, for
example, saw twentieth century judicial method as a continuation of
the "Grand Style" of the antebellum "Formative Era," when the
courts had brilliantly adapted the old common law to novel social
and economic needs.93 Hurst, Hartz, and the Handlins (only the first
strictly speaking a legal scholar) discovered a history of extensive state
promotion and regulation of the economy through legislative and ad-
ministrative as well as judicial action, 4 so that the New Deal, in per-
spective, could be seen as the culmination of an American tradition
91. See, e.g., Smith, Legal Cause in Actions of Tort (pt. 1), 25 HARV. L. REv. 103,
106-28 (1911) (manipulating traditional tests of causality in tort).
92. "Interest" theory in Progressive thought was given its most thorough and ab-
stract treatment by Roscoe Pound. See 3 R. POUND, supra note 54, at 15-24.
93. See K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 36-37 (1960); R. POUND, THE
FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW 93-94 (1938).
94. See 0. HANDLIN & M. HANDLIN, COMMONWEALTH 254-63 (1947); L. HARTZ, Eco-
NOMIC POLICY AND DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT 289-320 (1948); J. HURST, LAW AND THE CON-
DITIONS OF FREEDOM 33-70 (1956).
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of pragmatic response to social needs, without excessive fussing about
ideological laissez-faire. All of this work relied upon an implicit or
explicit Weberian view of the relationship of law to the social order.
The legal system had provided valuable and possibly indispensable
institutional support to the development of American capitalism, chief-
ly through the adoption of legal forms that promoted capital for-
mation, the security of exchange, and demolition of barriers to the
interstate mobility of capital and property, and through the develop-
ment of liability rules that favored dynamic entrepreneurs over static
rentier interests.
But if antebellum law had been adaptive, the Progressive genera-
tion agreed, the law of their late nineteenth and twentieth century
predecessors was woefully maladaptive. Harsh liability rules such as
the fellow-servant rule, or policies favoring unrestricted accumulation,
might have been necessary in the period of industrial takeoff, but these
ways of thinking had hardened into dogma, inhibiting reform through
legislative or administrative equilibration that could have dealt crea-
tively with the social consequences of organized capitalism. There was
a lag; the legal system was mired in immobility or, less kindly, cap-
tured by private interests. Lochner v. New York"5 symbolized the
historical low point: it is the counterpart, in the Progressive view,
of the old Whigs' Stuart despotism or the corruption of the Walpole
ministry. For judicial passivists, the evil was that judges had the nerve
to make social policy with broad implications; for activists, that the
policy made was maladaptive, out of tune with the course of social
development.
The process of historicizing continues, however, so that the Pro-
gressive view has suffered some recent shocks, which are exemplified
by work on the narrow subject of the Progressive interpretation of
history: Lawrence Friedman has restated the entire history of the
nineteenth century as one of interests-determined law. Before the
Civil War, a broad spectrum of interests united in wanting a law
that facilitated business, and got it. In the later period, these interests
had to contend with others at cross-purposes. The law was neither
more nor less adaptive later than earlier; it simply reflected different
constellations of interests. 96 In the other major modern synthesis,
95. 198 U.s. 45 (1905).
96. A legal system must respond to the needs of its time and its society. When
one speaks of a legal system as out of tune with its society, one is usually referring
to quite a different phenomenon: a conflict between parts of society or specific
interest groups in which the legal system, or some specialized institution, responds
to or reflects some interests but not others. To state, for example, that judges of the
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Morton Horwitz accepts the Progressive view of the active role of
the state and law in antebellum society, but argues that the social
functions served were expropriation on behalf of entrepreneurs and
protection of their profits from redistribution.97 In a sense, Horwitz
remains within the Progressive tradition in that he presents the re-
publican idea of a government serving all its citizens as betrayed (by
lawyers among others) to commercial interests; he departs from it in
locating the betrayal at the beginning, rather than the end, of the
nineteenth century. With one version or another of the thesis that
legal regulatory processes were captured by or designed to favor the
regulated,98 revisionists of both right and left have challenged the
Progressives' optimistic conclusion that they reclaimed the law from
exclusive service to special interests for the ideally adaptive maximiz-
ing of everyone's interest. At the same time, the Progressives' picture
of late nineteenth century law is being slowly painted over. Posner
has sought to vindicate the period's devotion to negligence as the basis
of tort liability;99 and McCurdy, Kennedy, and Atiyah, among others,
by taking legal "formalism" seriously on its own terms as a rationaliz-
ing enterprise, have made possible an understanding of it as a formi-
dably plausible ideological construct for its time, rather than simply
as a vast collective misguidedness or corruption. 00
Under these and similar shocks, the Progressive amalgam's long dom-
ination over the organization of scholarly thinking about law is break-
ing up, and nothing comparable is in prospect to replace it. Legal
scholars can still be found who write in all the traditional responsive
modes, but no new amalgam seems to be crystallizing. Perhaps this
is because law teachers have been recruited from a much broader
late nineteenth century who issued labor injunctions and voided welfare legislation
were out of step with their society or unresponsive to social needs is simply to take
the victor's view of history. These judges were out of step with a growing, powerful
social movement; but their decisions were enunciated in cases brought or defended
by real litigants with real economic and social interests.
Friedman, Heart Against Head: Perry Miller and the Legal Mind (Book Review), 77
YALE L.J. 1244, 1255 (1968). See generally L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 11.
97. M. HORWITZ, supra note 68, at 99-102.
98. See McCraw, Regulation in America: A Review Article, 49 Bus. HisT. REv. 159,
164-79 (1975) (surveying shifting views of regulation among economists, lawyers, his-
torians, and political scientists).
99. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STuD. 29, 29 (1972) (proposing a theory,
based on a sample of American court decisions from the period 1875-1905, of the social
function of the fault system of accident liability).
100. See, e.g., P. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CoNTRAcr 388-97 (1979);
Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1685, 1728-31,
1746-48 (1976); McCurdy, Justice Field and the Jurisprudence of Government-Business
Relations: Some Parameters of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 1863-1897, 61 J. AM. HIsT.
970. 1004-05 (1975).
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political spectrum than ever before, even in the 1930s; perhaps it is
also because scholars with totally incompatible intellectual stances
have sharpened their weapons against one another.
IV. Some Conclusions
In this delightfully heterodox climate there is reason to hope that
our mainstream legal scholarship will at last move beyond its standard
modes of responding to historicist assertions of the social contingency
of law and legal rationalization. Doubtless, there are no solutions to
the problems, but the modes as they have been practiced have in-
hibited the development of more interesting responses, calling forth
in their turn new criticisms, and so onward in a dialogue lifted clear
of the old gravitational field. Of course, there is also the risk, a serious
one if the historical experience is any guide, that the pull of the old
field will be too strong, so that attempts to break clear will be ignored
or defeated by misunderstanding. The idea behind this article is that
this risk may be avoided if one can identify some of the points of
impasse at which the dialogue has traditionally become stuck. Let me
conclude by pointing to some examples of how the dialogue is im-
poverished by sticking at those points, and of how much it could gain
by becoming unstuck.
Denial again. Unvarnished denials of the historicity of legal reason-
ing, for instance, are uninteresting contributions to the dialogue pre-
cisely because they deny there is a problem. Take for example a very
recent addition to the literature of denial by Richard Epstein,'0 ' ex-
emplary for the brilliance and baldness with which it puts the case for
the universality of basic legal principles. His article's strength is its
useful attack on shallow versions of the adaptationist idea that law
should change with changing circumstances, such as the notion that
we have gone from fault to strict liability in tort in order to adapt to
technological change. To this assertion, Epstein says truly, in relevant
respects circumstances have not changed in the past century.10 2 He
admits some kinds of social change might affect the validity of prin-
ciples expressed in a legal text: changing customs might change the
meaning of agreement, changing background regimes of public law
101. Epstein, The Static Conception of the Common Law, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 253 (1980).
102. He does not, however, have an explanation of his own for why rationales for
liability have changed as they have. Indeed, one of the problems with denial theory
generally is that its adherents must assert that entire societies, for whole epochs, just
get things wrong and adopt false ideas, but they have no way of making intelligible
why that should happen.
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might change the need for or impict of a rule of private law, and
changing values might change the analysis of the relative costs and
benefits of different activities.1 3 All other types of change are ruled
trivial. Whereas Romans inflicted harms with poisons, we do it with
automobiles, 04 but their principles of liability are the same as ours.
Though unusually breathtaking in the confidence with which it as-
serts the existence of history-independent legal principles, the article
is typical of the standard denial mode in ignoring the problems of
the historicity of consciousness itself. Epstein claims that we could
profitably discuss tort liability with a Roman lawyer. What could we
talk about? Superficially, perhaps quite a lot. We seem to have a com-
mon problem, the infliction and compensation of harms, and (along
with Holmes's dog' 05) a common perception that intentional are worse
than carelessly or accidentally inflicted harms. Even at this level of
very great generality, however, our ability to exchange ideas depends
on much more than our sharing and attempting to realize some uni-
versal moral propositions, such as comparable ideas of property, in-
juries to it, and compensation systems, all declared in a rational gen-
eral form, and enforced by a separate legal system. Of course, in the
case of tort, we happen to have still more in common, an impressively
large and detailed stock of categories of classification and conventional
modes of discourse, because since the twelfth century, with increasing
intensity in the nineteenth, legal scholars have made a determined
effort to resurrect the Roman categories and appropriate them to
modern use. To the extent we think the same way, it is surely in part
because we have tried so hard to do so. The taking of a similarity
grounded in deliberate cultural appropriation for the common rec-
ognition of a universal norm is circularity with a vengeance.
Of course, this borrowing does not mean that the set of norms is
not universally valid. As Charles Fried would undoubtedly say, maybe
we appropriated the Roman norms because they were the right ones. 06
103. Id. at 266-69.
104. Id. at 259-60.
105. See 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 3 (1881) ("[E]ven a dog distinguishes between
being stumbled over and being kicked.')
106. In the same symposium issue in which Epstein's article appears, Fried produces
a novel (at least to me) form of denial theory that seeks to account for changes in legal
texts by some means other than reference to their contexts. If I read him correctly, he
says that law changes when people are persuaded to change it by morally correct argu-
ments, so that the best way to explain why an argument was accepted is to ask whether
it was true. If one accepts Fried's premise that there is some suprahistorical means of
assessing the moral correctness of, say, arguments on points of medieval land law, and
his qualification that this is not a theory of moral progress because bad arguments may
persist for a long time (and may even be dominant now), the theory is unassailable from
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The trouble here lies in supposing that, because in some formulations
their texts can be lifted word for word from their context and still
make sense in ours, our norms are theirs. Consider one of Epstein's
examples of the proposition that "justifications [of legal rules] are
essentially independent of social changes": "In the law of contracts,
a promisee who uses force or fraud cannot demand performance of
the promise exacted from his promisor."' 07 If the other system has a
"law" of "contracts" recognizing and enforcing abstract promises sub-
ject to abstractly defined defenses, we can be confident of many basic
similarities between its universe of concepts and ours. Even this con-
fidence, however, may be premature. On being asked, "why do your
laws enforce this promise?" lawyers in the other system might say,
"because it was sworn under a banyan tree by the promisee's wife's
brother." Ours might say, "in order to support the functioning of
the market," an answer quite as mysterious to a world that is familiar
with exchange transactions but has no concept of an "economy" as
is the banyan-oath to ours.108 So too with force and fraud: any ex-
change of promises may be regarded as one of mutual threats to with-
hold performance unless the other side comes across. 109
Surely what one wants to know about another system is how it draws
the line between the voluntary and the coerced exchange, because only
by knowing that can one get a sense of the operational meanings it
gives to the notions of freedom and coercion. Knowing that it ex-
presses the general norms is about as useful as learning that a nation
calls itself a "people's democratic republic." 1 0 Leon Litwack has re-
the historicist perspective. If all that he is saying is that lawmakers usually believe in
what they are doing, and may be convinced to do something different by an argument
that is persuasive in the terms of their moral universe, his claim seems unexceptionable.
But the way to vindicate that thesis would be the historical attempt at reconstruction of
the lawmakers' moral universe, a necessary first step, it would seem, even for someone
who thinks as Fried apparently does that their universe's terms may be translated point
for point into some universal moral scheme of reference. See Fried, The Laws of Change:
The Cunning of Reason in Moral and Legal History, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 335, 336-39 (1980).
107. Epstein, supra note 101, at 256.
108. See M. FINLEY, THE ANCIENT ECONOMY 17-23 (1973) (modern economic concepts
and models not applicable to study of ancient economy); K. POLANYi, Aristotle Discovers
the Economy, in PRIMITIVE, ARCHAIC, AND MODERN ECONOMIEs 78, 84-86 (1968) (pre-modern
communities have no integrated concept of an "economy"). For a contrary view, see
Posner's characteristically sweeping argument, based on extensive reading in anthropo-
logical literatures, in Posner, A Theory of Primitive Society, with Special Reference to
Primitive Law, 23 J.L. & EcoN. 1, 2, 4-5 (1980) (explaining customs and institutions
of primitive society as economically rational adaptations to high information costs and
criticizing "excessively narrow view of what is economic").
109. See Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 603,
604 (1943).
110. Of course, even an interpreter with a fairly full catalogue of instances of ap-
plications of the norms may be seriously misled. A scheme of legal norms that narrow-
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cently shown us how, in the Reconstruction South, the idea of "con-
tract" with its happy connotations of free and mutual bargaining was
put to work to subject newly emancipated slaves to regimes of domina-
tion even worse than their former conditions of servitude.'" Likewise,
"property," with all its associations of the legal watch set about home
and hearth, may be used to protect an owner's security or help him
express his personality; it may also enable him to exclude others from
what they need except on the condition that they submit to his pow-
er.112 By now we are surely accustomed to the idea that "freedom of
contract" and "duress" are concepts with such extraordinary histor-
ical and cultural pliability that their meanings can be plausibly ex-
pounded only at a level of great particularity. 1 3 If we take just the
words, we are likely to become involved in absurd mistranslations-to
say "free contract," for example, where, if we knew the context, we
would be more likely to say "peonage."
At this stage one listens for the accusation of "Relativist!," but it is
really beside the point. One does not have to be a relativist to doubt
that our legal principles are universal simply because other places and
times have used conceptual language sounding rather like our own.
One is merely asserting that on closer investigation the resemblance
will come to appear superficial, and that anyone who seriously claims
that there are normative universals must try to reconstruct the lan-
guage in which the old text is embedded in sufficient detail to sup-
port a theory that something in the old text is comparable to some-
thing in the new." 4 The alternatives are almost certainly parochialism
(taking the norms we happen to be used to as the universals), ba-
nality (positing as universals a list of uselessly general and abstract
values), or mistranslation.
Some people would deny that even this more careful reconstruction
of other idea systems will make comparisons possible-either on the
ly restricts the scope of duties owed to others is one thing in a society that also has
strongly sanctioned norms of charitable duties-in such a society, legal restrictions are
only limitations on jurisdiction, not definitive statements about right behavior-and quite
another thing in a society where religious norms have atrophied.
111. L. LrrWAcK, BEEN IN THE STORM So LONG 408-20 (1979).
112. The most systematic treatment of this idea is found in K. RENNER, THE INsri-
TUTIONS oF PuvATr, LAw 104-58 (1949).
113. See Dawson, Economic Duress-An Essay in Perspective, 45 MicH. L. REv. 253.
288-89 (1947).
114. Cf. 0. HoLMEs, The Path of the Law, in CoLLEcrm LEGAL PAERS 167, 197-98
(1920):
I assume that, if it is well to study the Roman Law, it is well to study it as a
working system. That means mastering a set of technicalities more difficult and less
well understood than our own, and studying another course of history by which
even more than our own the Roman law must be explained.
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ground that the other legal ideas have meaning only in the terms of
their own contexts, so are not transferable to others, or on the ground
that reconstruction of the other system is futile because we can only
approach the task with our own apparatus of concepts, 115 and there
is no theory-independent conceptual language into which both our
own and the other system may be translated for comparative pur-
poses. 116 As Maitland put it:
If we speak, we must speak with words; if we think, we must
think with thoughts. We are modems and our words and thoughts
can not but be modern. Perhaps . . . it is too late for us to be
early English. Every thought will be too sharp, every word will
imply too many contrasts. 1 7
Others would maintain to the contrary that uncovering the structures
deeply underlying all conceptual schemes is possible. I am not taking
a position on this controversy because my point is the much more
limited one that nobody is going to get very far in meeting the threat
of historical contingency by the more elementary denials that it is a
problem. And one is cutting oneself off from the prospect of realizing
a greatly enriched understanding of one's own system of norms by
examining it in comparison with what appear to be very different
ones, the first step in that process of comparison being the attempt,
doomed though it may be, at reconstructing other systems.
The process of reconstruction may end up convincing us that the
other systems-the conceptual world of our Constitution-makers, for
example-is indeed discontinuous and unrecapturable. Even this dis-
covery would not have made the effort useless; we would at least have
learned, as Brest and Ely have tried to teach us,"18 the folly of a lit-
eralistic interpretation. And one could learn as well through the con-
trast. One of the aims of the recent work of Morton Horwitz, William
Nelson, and John Reid"" has been to identify the characteristics of
"modern" law (which they severally describe as instrumentalism, ad-
justing the claims of atomized individuals and interest groups, and
law-as-command) by reference to what they see as the "pre-modern"
law of the eighteenth century.1 20 But reconstruction might do more
115. See P. WINcH, THE IDEA OF A SOCIAL SCIENCE AND ITS RELATION TO PHILOSOPHY
86-91 (1958).
116. See R. Roiry, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE 315-94 (1979).
117. F. MAITLAND, TOWNSHIP AND BOROUGH 22 (1898).
118. See p. 1020 supra.
119. See M. HoRwrTz, supra note 68, at 16-30; W. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE
COMMON LAW 173-74 (1975); J. RED, supra note 17, at 128.
120. Hendrik Hartog pointed out this similarity to me.
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for us than that: it might demonstrate an actual continuity between
the old system and our own. This continuity might be evolutionary,
as was assumed by all the nineteenth-century theories of legal progress,
but might also be something much more interesting, a relationship
of structural analogy such as anthropologists have found, for instance,
between pre-scientific and scientific thought.121 To give an example
or two: Douglas Hay's deservedly celebrated essay on Property, Au-
thority, and the Criminal Law, 122 which showed the repressive advan-
tages gained when eighteenth-century criminal law combined a paper
regime of rarely enforced but terrifying sanctions with an enforce-
ment regime of merciful discretion, abundantly produces insights
into modern law, not only modem criminal justice administration
but any discretionary administration of a formal system: substitute
"street-level bureaucrats" or "political machine" for Hay's "country
gentry."
Just lately there has been emerging a remarkable literature on the
theme of representation: how our law constitutes artificial entities
(abstract individuals, classes of litigants, corporations, states) to rep-
resent real persons, then finds real persons to represent the entities
thus constituted; also how the law refuses to recognize some persons
and collectivities as capable of representing or being represented for
some purposes. This theme has been explored in such diverse legal
contexts as those of standing, 123 group litigation, 2 4 cities, 125 and state
action. 26 This literature is unusually and in some cases extremely
well-informed historically, with rewarding consequences. It is able to
show that the forms of representation that we happen to use do not
exhaust the stock of forms that have been historically available, but
that we have been unable to perceive or make use of other forms
because of basic conceptual limitations in modern liberal political
thought. It thus expands the range of possible forms of social organi-
zation and at the same time explains why the possibilities have gone
unrealized. If there is any hope of attaining the vision of the universal
for which the denial theorists long, it seems likely to be realized
through studies such as these of historically contingent particulars.
121. See, e.g., Barnes, The Comparison of Belief-systems: Anomaly Versus Falsehood,
in MODES OF THOUGHT 182, 186-88 (R. Horton & R. Finnegan eds. 1973).
122. Hay, supra note 58.
123. See J. VINING, supra note 66, at 13-33.
124. See Yeazell, From Group Litigation to Class Action, Part 1r: Interest, Class and
Representation, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1067, 1107-20 (1980).
125. See Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARv. L. Rav. 1057, 1081-82 (1980).
126. See Katz, Studies in Boundary Theory: Three Essays in Adjudication and Politics,
28 BUFFALO L. Rav. 383, 386-408 (1979).
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Embrace: Legal Theories of Social and Historical Contingency. After
considering denial, moving on to embrace comes as a relief because
the scholars who choose this strategy at least recognize the problem of
historicity and do not think it can be waved away with assertions that
nothing important to legal reasoning ever changes. The basic embrace
strategy-some version of adaptation theory-has been a valuable heu-
ristic, because it has directed attention to context and forced legal
scholars to elaborate ideas about relationships between texts and their
contexts. Anyone could have predicted that at first such ideas would
reinforce the usual inclinations of legal scholarship toward conserva-
tism or moderate law reform. The claim would be that if there were
differences between ideology and practice (the gap), they could be
closed by appropriate equilibrating mechanisms, or that if law had
been evolving, its evolution was nearly complete, or proceeding at a
very gradual rate, or moving (in the characteristically American con-
servative teleology) toward the unfolding of a pre-existing ideal.1 27
What is frustrating and alarming is that the intellectual develop-
ment of legal scholarship has so often stalled at this initial level of
response, and repelled, retarded, or pushed off to the margins most
attempts to go beyond it. I do not think it needs much demonstration
that legal history and the sociology of law have become marginal sub-
specialties in American law curricula, though there was a time in the
founding years at Harvard when every course was partly a legal his-
tory course. Likewise, for a moment in the 1920s, much of the Colum-
bia faculty dreamed that every course might be partly one in sociology.
I have tried elsewhere to tell the story of how the law schools ejected
legal history when it betrayed them by abandoning evolutionism.128
John Schlegel, in a fascinating article, 129 has been telling a similarly
dispiriting story about Yale's experiments with empiricism. One of
Schlegel's stories will serve as a parable. It had long been an article
of faith among moderate law reformers in the profession and the
schools that the people, as Pound put it, were dissatisfied with the
administration of justice,13 0 and that the cause must be the delay and
expense of court proceedings, which were in turn caused by unre-
formed law and procedure. At the high point of the rage for em-
127. See S. BEacovrrcH, supra note 36 (discussing teleology of American mission); R.
WELTER, supra note 36 (same).
128. Gordon, J. Willard Hurst and the Common Law Tradition in American Legal
Historiography, 10 LAw & Soc'" REv. 9, 17-19 (1975).
129. Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science: From the Yale
Experience, 28 BUFFALO L. REv. 459 (1979).
130. Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of justice,
29 A.B.A. REP. 395, 416-17 (1906).
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pirical research in the early 1930s, the Wickersham Commission in
effect asked Dean Clark of Yale and his research team to verify those
propositions. But the Clark team's study of the lower criminal courts
found anything but undue delay owing to excessive technicality; the
system, they said, "seems almost too efficient; because it presents the
spectacle of a long line of orderly offenders, few of whom it is neces-
sary to commit to jail either before or after trial, pleading guilty with
systematic regularity.., raising no technical objections .. ..,131 This
discovery no longer surprises us, but it did Clark's contemporaries in
academic law, who concluded in effect that it must be wrong. Disen-
chantment with empiricism soon followed; in a few years, it had all
but vanished.13 2
Adaptation theory, however, survived. Legal scholars continued to
assert that law was an adaptive technology: that legal forms had
adapted or could be adapted to serve given social functions, purposes,
or interests, and that some forms and institutions were especially adap-
tive (or "competent") for some functions, and grossly maladaptive
(or "incompetent") for others, the most common, but by no means
only, assertions being those about what courts were intrinsically good
or bad at doing. These arguments-as it is the professional function
of one of our best if definitely marginal journals, the Law & Society
Review, periodically to lament133-have in general been carried on in
a wilderness almost completely devoid of knowledge or apparent in-
terest in knowledge about what, for example, courts and legislatures
in this society actually do.
In particular, one might have hoFed that by now our legal schol-
ars would have developed adaptation theory from a set of ad hoc
insights into a full-scale historical sociology of law, in the tradition
131. Schlegel, supra note 129, at 504 (quoting Douglas, Arnold, & Clark, Progress
Report on the Study of Business of the Federal Courts 3 (n.d.) (draft) (in Clark Papers,
Beinecke Library, Yale University)).
132. Gilmore, And Now for Something Completely Different (Book Review), LAw
ALUMNI J., Summer 1975, at 38, 38 (Univ. of Chicago) (by early 1940s, "entire law faculty"
at Yale viewed law as "a sort of mystical absolute"). The substantive unacceptability of
the conclusions of historical and sociological scholarship, is, as the Schlegel article makes
clear, only one of the reasons for their disappearance from the legal mainstream. Others
are their alien methodologies, the lack of interest taken by most mainstream historians
and sociologists in legal subjects, and perhaps above all, their tendency to make any
problem on which they are brought to bear seem more complex and ambiguous, and its
solution more indeterminate, than it was before they were consulted. As Douglas Hay
said to me at the symposium, the maturing of history as a discipline in the late nine-
teenth century made it increasingly unusable for any immediately practical legal pur-
pose: any field that historians had well trampled was a tremendous battleground of
specialized professional controversy.
133. See, e.g., Cavanagh & Sarat, Thinking About Courts: Toward and Beyond a
Jurisprudence of Judicial Competence, 14 LAw & Soc'v Rxv. 371 (1980).
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of Weber, that would try to relate in a more or less systematic way
changes in legal forms to those in economy and society. 13 4 But in fact,
outside the books of Willard Hurst and his Wisconsin school, I can
think of only a handful of such studies in our scholarship, notably
Dawson's on contract law in inflationary economies.1 35 There are
signs of a revival: the entrepreneurial histories of Alfred Chandler
have inspired a resurgence of interest among legal scholars in the
contribution of legal technologies to corporate concentration in the
late nineteenth century; 136 Robert Clark has been developing an un-
usually detailed neo-Weberian evolutionary model to explain changes
in corporate law in a capitalist economy;137 in extraordinary com-
parative work, Mirjan Dama~ka has explored the connection between
rules and processes of criminal procedure, and variations in the struc-
tures of political authority;138 and Ian MacneiI, Oliver Williamson,
and Richard Danzig have developed functional theories of the rela-
tion of contract law to patterns of economic organization. 139
Had more of this work been done earlier, and been absorbed
into the bloodstream of the discipline, critical response to it, stressing
some of the theoretical limitations of adaptationism-the problems of
discontinuity between formal expression and applications, of false
dualism between "law" and society, of the indeterminate and con-
tradictory character of regimes of legal form, which makes it difficult
to show that any particular one is instrumental to any given economic
order-might have stimulated other kinds of historically minded
scholarship.
One example might be scholarship that set aside entirely the prem-
ise that the primary importance of legal texts lies in their functionally
134. For recent work explicitly in this tradition, see R. UNaER, LAw IN MoDERN So.
CiETY (1976), and Trubek, Toward a Social Theory of Law: An Essay on the Study of Law
and Development, 82 YALE L.J. 1, 40-50 (1972).
135. See Dawson, Effects of Inflation on Private Contracts: Germany, 1914-1924, 33
MIcH. L. REv. 171 (1934); Dawson & Cooper, Effects of Inflation on Private Contracts:
United States, 1861-1879 (pts. I & 2), 33 MICH. L. Rav. 706, 852 (1935).
136. See MANAGERIAL HIERARCHIES (A. Chandler & H. Daems eds. 1980); RxCHT uND
ENTWICKLUNG DERt GROSSUNTERNEHMEN IM 19. UND FRUHEN 20. JAHRHUNDERT (N. Horn & J.
Kocka eds. 1979).
137. See Clark, The Four Stages of Capitalism: Reflections on Investment Management
Treatises, 94 HARv. L. Ray. 561 (1981); Clark, The Interdisciplinary Study of Legal Evo-
lution, 90 YALE L.J. 1238 (1981).
138. See Damaika, Presentation of Evidence and Factfinding Precision, 123 U. PA. L.
REy. 1083 (1975); Damalka, Structures of Authority and Comparative Criminal Procedure,
84 YALE L.J. 480 (1975).
139. See I. MACNEIL, THE Naw SoCIAL CoNTRAcr (1980); Danzig, Hadley v. Baxendale:
A Study in the Industrialization of the Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 249 (1975); Williamson,
Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON.
233 (1979).
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serving some set of manifest sociaO needs, and took discontinuity as
its starting point. This approach could lead to an historical perspec-
tive on "legal pluralism," state-promoted norms competing with oth-
ers or for that matter, cooperating with others in a division of hege-
monic labor; alternatively, it could lead to a focus on the "latent"
function of even apparently maladaptive law. Douglas Hay's essay
on the criminal law140 is a stunning example of what can be sai'l
about the legitimating functions of unenforced rules. Arthur Leff, in
a characteristically bravura performance, has sketched a map of a com-
pletely new and potentially valuable territory of symbolic meanings
of legal texts that legal scholars who are tired of the old responses
can explore. 41
Adaptation theory in all its forms, as I have pointed out, assumes
that the social functions to which law is instrumental-interests, pur-
poses, needs-are exogenous to the legal system. That is, states need
security against foreign enemies, economies need growth, business
people need security of transactions, everyone needs free expression
and protection of property, and so forth. This false dualism makes
it hard to see how the legal order also helps to construct the social
world whose functions it serves: the "persons" and their "interests"
and the "harms" to those interests, not to mention "states" and "mar-
kets." We are now suddenly getting a flood of articles that address
the legal construction of social categories; this includes the literature
on the theme of representation1 42 and a novel genre of legal history
that treats-legal doctrine as ideology, a way of structuring social ex-
perience that seems to be a functional response to social needs but
is in fact a way of making the existing order seem natural and
necessary. 143
From Cartesianism to Rhetoric. I referred earlier to a quasi-Car-
tesian mode of response that legal scholars implicitly adopt whenever
they say to the historicist critic: "All this social and historical con-
tingency you talk about is no doubt highly interesting, but it is
really irrelevant to our task as lawyers, which is to work within a
140. See Hay, supra note 58.
141. See Leff, Law and, 87 YALE L.J. 989 (1978). Left has often written in the mode
of resignation, but instead of using it as a device for keeping historicism at bay, he has
fully incorporated historicist perspectives in his work and helped to advance the dialogue
as much as anyone now writing.
142. See p. 1050 supra.
143. See, e.g., M. TUSHNET, CONSIDERATIONS OF HUMANITY AND INTEREST: THE AMERICAN
LAw oF SLAvERY, 1810-1860 (forthcoming 1981, Princeton University Press); Kennedy,
supra note 67; Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins ot
Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MItN. L. REv. 265 (1978).
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certain well-established framework of normative analysis that takes
some basic premises about law-in-society-and-history as stipulated and
not open to question." This response is plausible enough, as far as
it goes. Many of the criticisms that historians make of lawyers' his-
tory are indeed irrelevant to the lawyer's task. At least the immediate
interest of historians is always in "historicizing" the past as much as
possible, tamping it down firmly into departed times and places.144
For lawyers, this method is useful only half the time, when they want
to get rid of some practice justified by tradition. At other times they
want not to deaden the past but to make new, mythic, traditions
out of it to use in current argument. It is pointless to say that such
myths are "inaccurate" from the standpoint of conventional histori-
ography, for they are so by definition. But that does not mean that
all historicist criticism of legal rhetorics is irrelevant, because the
critic could take the rhetorics on their own terms, instead of the
conventional historian's terms, and say, "This is bad mythmaking."
What would such criticism look like? It is hard to say, because the
dialogue hypothesized has yet to take place. Perhaps it would take
the form of objections that the lawyers' mythic uses of the past are
flawed because .myopic or incomplete, ignoring aspects of legal tra-
ditions that are alternative sources of drganizing or inspiring myths.
From this perspective, for instance, it might be possible to develop
the arguments, sometimes hinted at by historicist critics, 145 that cur-
rent legal rhetoric, by confining itself to dessicated, liberal individual-
ist or interest-group theories of politics, has cut itself off from the
civic humanism of the republican ideology of the founding genera-
tion, an ideology that has been periodically resurgent in our poli-
tics 146 and that our scholarship should try to reincorporate into our
standard normative reasoning modes.
Envoi. There seems, in view of these suddenly blooming wild-
flowers, reason to hope that our mainstream legal scholarship may
at last have been shaken out of its old habits. Yet one cannot be too
confident of this. Its basic paradigms, especially adaptation theories,
have proved quite amazingly resilient to shock after shock. Because
they assume a benign continuity between law and social change,
144. See M. OAKESHoTr, The Activity of being an Historian, in RATIONALISM IN Pou-
TIcs 137, 164-67 (1962).
145. For versions of such arguments, see Brest, supra note 53, at 1105-09, Frug, supra
note 125, at 1087-90, and Michelman, Politics and Values or What's Really Wrong with Ra-
tionality Review? 13 CREIGHTON L. REv. 487, 506-10 (1979).
146. See Ross, The Liberal Tradition Revisited and the Republican Tradition Ad-
dressed, in NEw DincriONS IN AMEicAN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 116 (J. Higham & P.
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rather than taking it as problematic such theories have inhibited the
development of richly empirical and historical descriptions of how
people in society, lawyers and others, actually experience their legal
order. While seeking to make the law more effective in the name of
a pragmatic empiricism, these theories have restricted thinking about
law to minor changes in its present forms, thereby preventing us both
from learning what law as experienced in social life is really like and
from imagining that law might be other than the way it is. Adapta-
tion theory has been the most subtly apologetic of the responsive
modes, because it views "society" and "history" as a largely deter-
mined background of forces that nobody can do much about, but
sees "law" as the largely free creation of lawyers and jurists, who
can adapt to predetermined social change more or less efficiently,
depending on how cleverly they design institutions or doctrines. The
theory is thus doubly misleading because it denies our responsibility
for the ways in which legal ideas contribute to the constitution and
reproduction of the society "out there" and denies the social con-
tingency of our thinking about law, which drastically (and in my
view unnecessarily) restricts its range.
There is no use pretending that some extraordinary new revela-
tion is at hand, but the work that I have described (and much other
work as well) seems to help point the way out of this curious im-
passe, to move legal scholarship beyond its long practiced modes of
response. Yet virtually all this work, in one way or another, trans-
gresses the principal ambitions of our scholarship: some of it claims
that much of current law, instead &f making sense, is contradictory
and incoherent; some of it that current law in operation is ineffectual
or harmful; and from practically none of it could anyone extract an
immediately useful policy proposal. For some people, this last fact
alone settles the matter: why are we wasting their time? But even they
might pause to consider that if work, otherwise interesting, does
not generate what the paradigm considers acceptable conclusions, per-
haps the fault lies with the paradigm. What is being proposed here,
and in the work I have described, is a kind of reverse Faustian bar-
gain: our sacrifice of immediate influence in the councils of the great
for a potentially enormous increase in understanding of our condition.
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